Rogers outage: a router configuration error knocks out mobile, internet and 911 access across Canada

During a core network upgrade, a configuration error on routers feeding Rogers' core network flooded the core routers with routing data until they failed; more than 12 million customers lost service for over a day.

Resolved
Security:
No determination
Started
Jul 8, 2022
Ended
Not documented
Duration
Not computable from sources
Full recovery
Not documented
Geographic scope
Canada
Last verified
3 sources

What happened

Systems and services affected
Rogers mobileHome phone and internetBusiness wireline9-1-1 callingPayment networks relying on Rogers mobile
Kind of failure
Configuration change
Sector
Telecommunications
Provider report
Published
Status and recovery
Resolved. Services began to be restored after more than a day. The sources read here do not give a time when service was fully restored.[2][3]

The outage began in the early morning of July 8. Reports give its length as more than 24 hours (Canadian Press) and over 26 hours before services started to be restored (iPhone in Canada).

What caused it?

Root cause: Confirmed

During the sixth of seven phases of an IP core upgrade, an error in configuring the distribution routers led to "an overwhelming flood of IP routing information into the core network routers," which failed. The report says it could have been prevented had the core routers been configured with an overload limit.[1][2][3]

Provider report: Published. An independent assessment by Xona Partners was published by the CRTC, Canada's telecom regulator, in July 2024.[1][2]

Was it malicious?

No determination

The sources read here attribute the outage to a configuration error and do not discuss an attack.[2][3]

How the failure happened

  1. 1TriggerIP core upgrade, phase 6 of 7
  2. 2FailureFlood of routing information
  3. 3SpreadCore routers failed
  4. Affected5 services and systems

Evidence for each step

  1. 1
    IP core upgrade, phase 6 of 7. Error configuring the distribution routers[1]
    Starting point.
  2. 2
    Flood of routing information. Into the core network routers[1]
    Led from step 1: Stated in a provider report or official record.
  3. 3
    Core routers failed. No overload limit was configured[1]
    Led from step 2: Stated in a provider report or official record.

Only steps the sources state are drawn. Affected services are listed under What happened.

Explanation

Both versions summarize the sourced claims on this page. Our own interpretation appears only under Independent analysis.

Plain language: what happened and why people were affected.

On July 8, 2022, millions of Rogers customers in Canada lost mobile, internet and home phone service for more than a day. Some people could not reach 911, and some card payment systems stopped working.

During a planned upgrade, staff changed settings on routers that feed Rogers' central network. That let a flood of routing information through, and the central routers failed under it.

Rogers staff could not get to the routers' error logs at first, and it took about 14 hours to find the cause.

Confirmed and unknown

Confirmed

  • Confirmed
    A configuration error on the distribution routers led to a flood of IP routing information into the core routers.[1][3]
    Said by: Xona Partners report, published by the CRTC · Evidence: Official, News
  • Confirmed
    The failure could have been prevented had the core routers been configured with an overload limit.[1][3]
    Said by: Xona Partners report · Evidence: Official, News

Stated or reported, not confirmed

  • Reported
    It took about 14 hours to identify the root cause; staff initially lacked access to router error logs.[2][3]
    Evidence: News
  • Reported
    More than 12 million customers were affected, and 9-1-1 calling was disrupted.[2][3]
    Evidence: News

Sources disagree

  • Disputed
    The outage lasted more than 24 hours / over 26 hours before services started to be restored.[2][3]
    Evidence: News

Still unknown

  • When service was fully restored for all customers (not stated in the sources read here).

Timeline

Times in UTC. Dates without a time mean the sources give no time. Only events a source documents are listed.

  1. First observedJul 8, 2022
  2. AcknowledgedNot documented
  3. MitigationNot documented
  4. RecoveryNot documented
  5. ResolvedNot documented
  6. Incident reportJul 5, 2024
  1. First observed
    Core routers fail during the upgrade; mobile, internet and 911 access disrupted across Canada.[2]
  2. Incident report
    CRTC posts the independent Xona Partners assessment.[1][2]

Evidence and sources

Grouped by type of evidence. Numbers match the citations above.

Primary: provider and official sources

Published by the provider or agency itself: incident reports, status records, advisories, statements.

  1. 1.
    Assessment of Rogers Networks for Resiliency and Reliability Following the 8 July 2022 Outage: Executive Summary (opens in a new tab)
    CRTC (report by Xona Partners) · Official statement · Published · Accessed
    We could not open this page directly (it blocks automated reading). Its quoted findings are confirmed through Canadian Press and iPhone in Canada.

Independent reporting

News organizations reporting statements, impact and their own findings.

  1. 2.
    CRTC posts independent report on Rogers outage, says company made necessary changes (opens in a new tab)
    The Canadian Press (via BNN Bloomberg) · News · Published · Accessed
  2. 3.
    CRTC Report Explains the 'Catastrophic' Rogers Outage from 2022 (opens in a new tab)
    iPhone in Canada · News · Publication date not recorded · Accessed
    Quotes the Xona Partners report. Original publication date not shown; updated July 5, 2024.

Last verified against these sources on Nov 14, 2026.